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Funds of Funds Restructure to Cope With Madoff Exposure

Friday, 2 January 2009

David Walker, of Financial News, files this dispatch on how the Bernard Madoff scandal is changing the hedge-fund industry. Financial News is a Dow Jones publication and a contributor to Deal Journal.

Funds of hedge funds have begun to revise the way they are paying out redeeming investors, and are locking others in completely, in a bid to cope with the fallout from their own investments in portfolios exposed to alleged New York fraudster Bernard Madoff.

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financialnewsDirectors of a number of products linked to the AllWeather fund, the flagship fund of hedge funds overseen by Pioneer Alternative Investments, have established separate portions of their vehicles to isolate their exposures to Bernard Madoff. The funds’ directors have also frozen subscriptions to their portfolios, according to a filing with the Irish Stock Exchange.

Directors of Momentum AllWeather Strategies, a 13-year old fund of hedge funds, are this week isolating illiquid assets, including those related to Madoff, from other, unaffected investments in AllWeather.

The directors said in a regulatory filing the move would “protect existing investors in the fund from the illiquid assets which the fund has received and which represent approximately 27% of the net asset value of the fund.” AllWeather was exposed to Madoff via its investment in Kingate Global fund.

Investor documents seen by Financial News showed that the $2.8bn Kingate Global Fund displayed average annual returns of 11.6% since beginning in 1995, on annualised volatility of 2.6%. Its largest fall in value was 0.6% in the three months from December 2002.

Investors withdrawing from AllWeather and at least five products feeding into it, will receive their redemption partly in cash, and partly in shares attached to the isolated portion.

Separately Pioneer’s US peer, Fairfield Greenwich, has stopped releasing valuations for its Fairfield Sentry hedge fund - effectively locking investors in - as it assesses the damage of Sentry’s exposure to Madoff, according to a statement on the firm’s website.

Fairfield has aggregate exposure to the New York trader of about $7.3bn (€5.1bn). A document seen by Financial News from an investor in hedge funds showed Fairfield Sentry documented an average annual return of 11.3% since its inception in 1990, on volatility of just 2.5%.

Pioneer Alternative Investments did not return calls seeking further comment. Fairfield Greenwich and Kingate could not be reached for comment by the time this article went to press.

Madoff is under house arrest facing fraud charges for allegedly passing off a pyramid scheme he ran as a series of hedge funds. He is alleged to have paid out redeeming investors with money from incoming subscribers, and concealed losses of up to $50bn in the process.

source: wsj deal journal

Hedge Fund Returns: The Worst Year Evah

Wednesday, 31 December 2008

That hedge funds have done poorly this year isn’t exactly a surprise. Still, the end of the year brings data that quantify the damage. David Walker of Financial News files this dispatch on how hedge funds are poised for the worst year on record. Financial News is a Dow Jones publication and a contributor to Deal Journal.

The global hedge-fund industry will register its worst year in almost two decades unless hedge funds can increase the value of their investments by more than a fifth before midnight Wednesday. It brings to an end a miserable year for the sector, which has been battered by falling markets and record redemption requests.

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financialnewsHedge funds have until New Year’s Eve to earn a 21.7 percentage point rise on their investments or the industry will have had its worst year since at least 1990, according to Hedge Fund Research.

Turbulent markets and the record investor redemptions in the latter part of this year that forced hedge fund managers to sell investments into falling markets, left the industry down more than 23% by Christmas Eve, according to HFR’s investable index. Global shares, by comparison, fell 44% this year.

HFR found that only two of the investment strategies pursued by hedge funds that it monitors yielded investors a profit by Christmas Eve. Hedge funds that invested in companies undergoing mergers or acquisitions returned 1.5% through Dec. 24, while portfolios whose managers invest in instruments linked to macroeconomic variables earned 3.8%.

Returns from the other six strategies make for grim reading for an industry whose previous worst year was a 1.5% decline in 2002. That had been the only decline in the 28 years HFR has monitored performance. The sector rebounded strongly in 2003, returning 19.6%.

Convertible-bond arbitrage fell 58%, while funds staking cash on price disparities of related financial instruments fell nearly 38%. Those investing in market events, distressed securities and equities generally were down 23% to 27%. Funds that balance amounts they put on shares rising while others fall shed only 0.9%.

Investors in hedge funds said that next year should improve, and that global macro and computer-driven funds would fare best. Guido Bolliger, co-chief investment officer at Olympia Capital Management, said global macro managers had “aligned their style with the economic climate expected to prevail next year.” He added that global macro did well when market volatility was high, which he expected it to be “for the next few months”.

However Craig Baker, global head of manager research at consultants Watson Wyatt, said funds would continue closing down next year and “mass redemptions over coming weeks will affect short-term performance”.

HFR said 693 funds, or 6.9% of the industry, closed in the first three quarters of this year alone as losses were compounded by record monthly withdrawals of about $77 billion in September and October.

source: wsj deal journal

Mergers and elections? What lies in store for the year ahead? - Scotsman

Sunday, 28 December 2008
Mergers and elections? What lies in store for the year ahead?
Scotsman, United Kingdom - 18 hours ago
At least one UK national newspaper comes close to closure or merger with another. 4 A big hedge fund in the City collapses. 5 There is a UK general election

source: google

Accounting board punts on new hedging rules

Friday, 19 December 2008

The Financial Accounting Standards Board’s little-noted decision last week to indefinitely postpone a proposed revision to its famously complex accounting rules for derivatives is good news for companies that use such financial instruments to hedge…

source: google

Diary of a Hedge Fund Manager(s) in a Market Storm

Friday, 19 December 2008

The journals of Samuel Pepys provide invaluable first-hand accounts of the Great Fire of London and the Plague. But no such document is known to exist for the tumultuous events of the past year, when the hedge-fund industry lost $154 billion, or 16% of its assets. So Financial News asked people in the industry for their impressions of the past few months, including Corazon Capital Management’s Ian Morley, Managed Funds Association’s Roger Hollingsworth, Maxam Capital Management’s Sandra Manzke, Polar Capital’s Philip Hardy and Fleckenstein Capital’s Bill Fleckenstein. Stephanie Baum and David Walker combined their comments into one voice, which Deal Journal has excerpted here. To see the entire diary, click here. Financial News is a Dow Jones publication and a contributor to Deal Journal.

hedgefunddiarySeptember 15
Oh. My. God. Lehman has collapsed. The firm filed for bankruptcy protection in the U.S., the European business will surely follow.

Got in before six this morning, more than anything to watch the events unfold. Nothing to do in terms of trading–the decisions had already been made.

This can’t be another Bear Stearns. It’s like 24 hours of doom. European markets are echoing the panic of the day before in the U.S. and the panic of Asian markets. Things aren’t panicky and stressful like some of my hedge-fund mates are going through, but there’s a growing feeling of uncertainty. Everyone wants to feel like they’re in one of the safer pockets of the industry, but they aren’t. Things aren’t as uncorrelated as we might have thought. We’ve scrutinized our positions. When one of those things happens, it’s like a shot across the bow.

September 19
I heard the news today about the Financial Services Authority imposing a temporary – how temporary? – restriction on short-selling of financial firms. What is the Government doing? I don’t get it. Shorting companies is the best way of seeing where the weakness lies in the market or that something is wrong. The Treasury has chopped off a vital source of information. Now we’re flying blind. This is not good.

September 22
The Bush Administration is proposing to rescue the U.S. financial-services sector–seeking authority for the Treasury Department to acquire as much as $700 billion in so-called toxic mortgage-related assets. Markets will bounce, but they’re still jittery. Good gesture, but let’s wait for the fine print.

September 25
The U.K’s FSA is threatening to impose fines on market participants that violate the ban on short-selling of financials. The ban is lunacy, it is almost embarrassing–showing how the authorities do not understand the problem. The ban is blowing up funds that are market-neutral, not just those selling short.

September 30
Was talking with a fund-of-funds manager I know. She said: “For the most part our hedge-fund managers have handled things extraordinarily well. But one European manager was giving us bad vibes. We felt like he was stonewalling us. They were in an illiquid position, and we asked what’s your way out of it? He said they didn’t know. Next day he was gone.

October 7
Iceland has imploded–I’ve almost got used to banks kicking the bucket, but a whole country? After a weekend scrambling to find cash to rescue its banking system, the Icelandic Government has nationalized Landsbanki and even went cap in hand to Russia for a €4 billion loan! Oh, and it has banned short-selling in financial stocks.

It didn’t hurt us, but we saw it coming. Everyone knew Iceland’s entire economy was built on leverage, didn’t they?

November 6
On the way to lunch, I bumped into a mate who works at a fund-of-funds manager: “Letters to investors apologizing for performance have been falling like leaves from trees. And as soon as you rake them up, it rains again and your lawn is covered with them all over again.” Eek.

December 1
Grabbed a quick coffee with a manager. He said: “I am still surprised to see reports of hedge funds asking for more money, immediately after losing 50% of their capital by levering, to lever more. It seems people are simply not willing to accept the new reality. Our performance to date has been strong, relative to our sector in that we’re down single-digits. Good relative performance that’s not positive doesn’t net anyone anything, and we hate not making money for our investors.”

source: wsj deal journal

How companies should engage shareholders

Tuesday, 16 December 2008

the deal

Activist investors

Friday, 5 December 2008

the deal

Hedge fund Avenue Capital says good time to buy

Wednesday, 3 December 2008

HONG KONG, Dec 3 (Reuters) - Financial assets have become so cheap that now is a good time to buy them, the head of one of the world’s biggest hedge funds, Avenue Capital, said on Wednesday.

source: reuters

Los hedge funds y la crisis

Thursday, 27 November 2008

Dada la escasa información disponible sobre las operaciones de los hedge funds, no resulta fácil valorar su incidencia sobre la crisis. En cualquier caso para evaluar su actuación deben tenerse en cuenta los hechos siguientes: 1. En los últimos seis meses los hedge…[+]

fuente: cotizalia

Hedge funds change rules to stem redemptions

Wednesday, 26 November 2008

ZURICH/LONDON (Reuters) - Hedge funds are trying stem the rising tide of investors taking out their cash but conditions they are imposing may result in a permanent reduction in the high management fees they charge.

source: reuters

Volatile markets may tempt hedge-fund fraud

Friday, 21 November 2008

BOSTON (Reuters) - While fraud can happen any time, the loosely regulated $1.7 trillion hedge-fund industry looks especially vulnerable following record losses.

source: reuters

U.S. banks help cut losses on locked hedge funds

Wednesday, 19 November 2008

NEW YORK (Reuters) - The same Wall Street dealers that offered sophisticated derivatives that allowed investors to magnify their risks are now pitching elaborate instruments designed to reduce exposure to cratering hedge funds.

source: reuters

Advice to Obama: A Hedge Fund Manager Speaks

Sunday, 16 November 2008

“Hedge funds don’t employ a lot of voters; they have small staffs.”

This wry statement came from Pershing Square founder William Ackman. Ackman has become something of a de facto spokesman for a certain swath of the hedge fund industry: whether it comes to short-selling or activism, he is willing to be outspoken for an industry that usually keeps its thoughts to itself — except when it is forced to testify before Congress.

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David M. Russell for The Wall Street Journal

That’s why we took notes earlier this week when Ackman joined Greenlight Capital founder David Einhorn and Third Point Capital founder Daniel Loeb to discuss the financial crisis at an event sponsored by New York’s Center for Jewish History. During the wide-ranging discussion, Ackman and his fellow activists discussed what they wanted from an Obama administration. Loeb and Einhorn largely agreed with what Ackman proposed as a wish list for the Obama administration.

So what should President-elect Obama do first to handle the financial crisis? Here is what we heard.

1. A “really good” Treasury secretary who is a man of action, like Hank Paulson, but receptive to ideas.

As you would expect, the “ideas” in question may well come from the hedge fund industry. Hedgehogs have traditionally kept Washington lawmakers at arm’s length — or the end of a 10-foot pole. As this week’s Congressional hearings showed, however, hedge funds are now willing to step into the fray with solutions for the financial crisis. That is especially true when it comes to valuing debt securities and the regulation of derivatives, including credit-default swaps. Hedge funds often don’t like investment banks — their frequent trading partners — but neither do they want the alternative of too much government interference in money matters. “I don’t think the government should be setting the price on financial assets,” Ackman pointed out with respect to the Treasury’s abandoned plan to buy troubled mortgage assets.

2. A chairman for the Securities and Exchange Commission who is sympathetic to short-sellers.

There is self-interest in Ackman’s support of a short-seller-supportive regulator, of course. But dig deeper: Hedge funds as a whole were taken aback by the spur-of-the-moment ban on short-selling. Ackman wants an SEC chairman who acknowledges the short-selling ban was a mistake and will never again make sweeping changes without extensive public discussion.

3. Fix the Fannie/Freddie restructuring.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are under government control, but the situation at the government-sponsored enterprises is no better. In Ackman’s opinion, the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mae bailouts were too influenced by political concerns rather than economic ones: “We want key players to act in an economically rational, apolitical fashion,” he said. Ackman did not provide specifics on what the government should do with Fannie and Freddie — but then, that’s what lobbying trips are for.

source: wsj deal journal

U.S. hedge funds anxious as redemption deadline looms

Friday, 14 November 2008

BOSTON (Reuters) - Anxiety is sweeping the hedge fund industry before a crucial deadline on Saturday, when investors angered by recent heavy losses are expected to demand the return of billions of dollars.

source: reuters

Hedge Funds on the Hill: Live-Blogging the Hearings

Friday, 14 November 2008
hedgefunds1113_P_20081113124326.jpgReuters

Hedge fund directors George Soros (L-R), chairman of Soros Fund Management LLC, James Simons, director of Renaissance Technologies LLC, John Alfred Paulson, president of Paulson & Co Inc, Philip Falcone, senior managing director of Harbinger Capital Partners, and Kenneth Griffin, CEO and managing director of the Citadel Investment Group, are sworn in to testify before a US House Oversight and Government Reform Committee hearing on the regulation of hedge funds, on Capitol Hill in Washington November 13, 2008.

A hedge fund manager recently quipped in our presence, “regulating hedge funds is like protecting millionaires from billionaires.”

And yet, this cadre of financial elites can be quite populist when they want to — particularly when they can share the U.S. taxpayers’ frustrations against the appointed scapegoats of the crisis: investment banks and ratings firms. Both the banks and the ratings agencies have been rivals and obstructions to the greater glory of hedge funds, and we have sensed the hedge funds’ need for revenge.

So, as five prominent hedge fund managers testify today in front of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee — you can see our introduction to the proceedings and some of the statements here — Deal Journal tuned in, expecting to hear a lot of hedge funds prove how they share many of the same interests as average taxpayers. We weren’t disappointed, as Congress quickly identified the hedge-fund managers as governmental allies against the investment banks. We’re live-blogging it.

12:25: Phil Falcone of Harbinger Capital Partners gives his opening remarks. He looks like a besuited John Lennon, with round glasses and artfully shaggy hair. He wants Congress to know this: Compensation in the hedge fund world is performance based, and that works. Short-selling is a long-standing and valuable feature of our markets.

12:27: We were so right about the populism. Falcone points out he grew up working class, and his mother worked in the local shirt factory. It includes details of the square footage of the house he grew up in. “Not everyone who runs a hedge fund was born on Fifth Avenue. That is the beauty of America and the beauty of our industry.” Very Horatio Alger, and it shows the savvy Falcone knows his audience. Congress eats this up as a great support to Main Street. Our president was just elected on a similar platform, after all.

12:28: Harbinger is doing well, and that’s fine. But it’s bad for management of companies to take compensation when the company is failing, Falcone says.

12:29: Hedge funds encourage “outside the box” thinking. Isn’t that part of the problem? Or rather, that no one can see the box, or know what’s in it?

12:30: Falcone says, “While I was growing up, my family may have lacked money, but we didn’t lack integrity in what we did and how we did it….I love this country and am grateful for the opportunity I’ve been provided.” He wants people to see the hedge fund industry as “part of the solution for the economic turmoil.” Cue the Star-Spangled Banner.

12:32: Ken Griffin of Citadel is up next. “We call financial risk-taking research and development.” Good line.

12:34:
“The concept of ‘too interconnected to fail’ has replaced ‘too big to fail,” Griffin says. Another good line. The Committee appears to be silently sizing up his speechwriting ability.

12:36: Questions begin. “Witnesses will not be required to answer questions unrelated to the topic of today’s hearing,” Waxman warns. Later, this turns out to be unfounded, as the Committee is all too eager to talk about the topic of today’s hearing. At length.

12:37: Waxman begins at the beginning: with systemic risk. Long-Term Capital Management, which was leveraged about 33 times and nearly collapsed, requiring a government-brokered bailout. Seriously, everyone in the entire hedge fund industry could devote the rest of their lives to digging wells for poor villagers in Africa, and they will still never be absolved from the LTCM debacle.

12:38: George Soros starts, in his euphonious accent. The power of hedge funds does justify greater financial regulation, he says. Just like that! We’re surprised, since the industry fought regulation for years. But then, he didn’t make his money by being on the wrong side of a trade, even a political one. Most of the others agree.

12:41: John Paulson says that hedge funds do not need as much control over their use of leverage as banks and financial institutions. “The problems at LTCM were minuscule compared to the $150 billion at AIG, the $700 billion in the TARP program, or even the capital advanced to GE.”

12:43: Falcone: “With $1 trillion outstanding…the industry is not nearly as levered as some of the banking institutions we did business with over the past few years.”

12:44: Griffin advertises Citadel’s joint effort to create a derivatives clearinghouse with the CME. This is sort of like product placement in movies, but with complicated financial systems. He advocates private-market solutions like that. Griffin is the first to say he believes that the hedge fund industry does not need more regulation. Waxman breaks in to note that some of the private-market solutions were brokered by the Fed. Griffin shoots back, “If we look at the stress points, they have been in the regulated institutions like AIG.” Oh, snap. Hedge funds have not been part of the carnage, he notes. Well, that’s not exactly true — plenty have gone out of business — but it is true that the failures of regulated institutions were much, much larger.

12:45:
All of the hedge fund managers say they are willing to disclose their positions, but not to the public — only if the government keeps them confidential. Because the U.S. government is soooo great at keeping secrets, we presume. Griffin dramatically states that asking hedge funds to disclose their positions would be like asking Coca-Cola to disclose the recipe for Coke. Oh, boy. He invoked Coke. Next we expect to hear about the sanctity of the recipes for motherhood and apple pie.

12:52: Paulson: “It doesn’t make sense to me that the government puts in capital, the banks take the capital, and then that capital comes out the other door in the form of dividends.” He wants restrictions on cash compensation, and any bonuses should be paid in common stock (meaning, not in stock options or restricted stock.) This will protect taxpayers and restore badly needed capital to these institutions.

12:53: Simons reminisces about how he suggested to former Treasury official Bob Steel that the government set up a two-sided auction process, matching buyers of troubled assets with sellers of those assets. Great idea, sure, but the problem all along was that there were no buyers. Simons explains that the assets would be significantly marked down.

12:55: Soros says that if the asset purchases were done properly, $700 billion would have been enough to fix the “gaping hole” in the markets. He believed TARP should only have underwritten the securities, not acquired them, and underwritten them on terms that would be beneficial for taxpayers.

12:58: The next questioner points out why these hearings are so mild: every single manager up there has made a ton of money this year. These calm, gathered billionaires are hardly poster children for failure, thus their mild, helpful, even jolly demeanors. The Congressman only cares about one thing, though: How did they do so well?

12:59: Griffin answers first, and much to his credit he confesses that Citadel had a tough eight weeks. He also says that no risk management system would have identified what happened over the past eight weeks. True, true.


1:00:
Falcone attributes his firm’s ability to “weather the storm” to their “diligence.” It took him eight to 12 months of analysis before he invested in the mortgage market. Subtext: Hedge funds are thoughtful, and not trigger happy like the banks. Bad, bad banks.

1:08:
Soros: “Markets that allow short-selling tend to be more stable than those prohibiting them.”

1:13: Griffin blames the lack of a central clearinghouse for derivatives for pushing “thousands of high-paying jobs abroad.”

1:15: After an incredibly long-winded question that wanders everywhere from George Soros’s recent book to the state of the financial system, Rep. Carolyn Maloney retreads all the answers that the managers have already given: Yes, they would agree to disclosure and transparency.

1:17: Maloney is officially incapable of asking a question in less than 200 words. She yields with respect. Congress is being so much nicer to hedge fund managers than they were to bankers, who received the grilling of their lives in a TARP hearing earlier today.

1:23: Rep. Shays asks questions about whether hedge fund managers should have their money in all of their funds. Griffin notes that the fund he has his money in has lost more money than his firm’s other funds. Soros answers that to avoid precisely that conflict of interest, he has only one fund, and that all his money is in it. Shays asks how that fund’s performance compares to Soros’s other funds. His other funds of…one fund, he means? Shays then turns to Simons, who he accuses of mumbling and cuts off. The remaining two managers race through their answers. Watching Shays work is like watching a drive-by.

1:25
Rep. Cummings says the five managers are “richer than God,” and promises not to disclose their individual compensation, but each of them made $1 billion last year on average, he says. He notes that they are not taxed like normal citizens because they are taxed at lower capital-gains rates. As the managers start to reply, Cummings orders, “I want you to keep your voices up for my questions.”

1:28: Paulson replies, somewhat condescendingly, “I appreciate your concern for the tax code,” or something to that effect. Falcone says that hedge funds should not be treated differently than other investors, and notes that 98% of his income last year should have been taxed as ordinary income. Paulson argues that there’s no problem with taxing short-term capital gains at the short-term rate, and long-term gains at the long-term rates. Griffin compares the tax treatment to being a chef and co-founder at a restaurant; he works every day (slaving over hot convertibles and plating steaming credit-default swaps) and when the restaurant is sold, he pays long-term capital gains. It’s not a complicated concept.

1:33: Rep. Tierney shows himself confused at the difference between management fees –taxed as ordinary income — and carried interest. He also is confusing the basic difference between “goods” and “services,” as he claims that hedge fund managers are not expending effort that requires remuneration when they are investing other people’s money. He basically believes management fees shouldn’t exist. So hedge fund managers should work for free? Great business model. If it applied everywhere, then Congressmen would not get salaries for representing their constituents, right? Then he accuses Griffin of using the restaurant analogy to confuse people.

1:34: Rep. Tierney decides that John Paulson should be in charge of TARP, instead of Hank Paulson. The veering from attacking Griffin to loving Paulson makes us dizzy.

1:38: Rep. Yarmuth launches into a long reminiscences of the hearings that included Angelo Mozilo earlier this year. Keep in mind, the representatives only have five minutes total, including questions and answers. We notice they’re spending much of that time talking, and then cutting off the hedge fund managers later.

1:41: Griffin says corporate leaders need to take risk in order to push innovation.

1:43: Rep. Cooper — apparently moonlighting as a newspaper editor — says grandly that the “headline of this hearing is Paulson v. Paulson: John Paulson accuses Hank Paulson of botching the bailout.” We didn’t hear that.

1:44: Paulson immediately points out that he, um, never criticized Hank Paulson or accused him of botching the bailout. Instead, he believes Hank Paulson has reoriented the bailout in the right way. Sure, but does he expect Congress to let facts get in the way of a good sound bite?

1:46: Rep. Cooper asks how much volatility in the markets is enough. “2,000?” We’d be surprised if he gets an answer. He doesn’t.

1:48: Soros points out that the obsession with risk has left out the importance of volatility and uncertainty. It’s a good point.

1:49: Rep. Cooper accuses Citadel of having a conflict of interest in launching a clearinghouse with the CME. Griffin says there is no conflict because Citadel will contribute intellectual capital, while CME will actually run the clearinghouse. Cooper is not happy with having to rely on a Chinese wall, rather than a real separation.

1:50: Rep. Van Hollen asks, in a two-and-a-half-minute long question, something about hedge fund regulation that takes multiple byways. The question appears to be about regulation, and whether regulators should have greater powers, including setting leverage ratios.

1:52: Soros notes that useful old laws on leverage ratios and other things have fallen out of use and should be reinstated. All the other hedge fund managers agree. Griffin turns the question back to clearinghouses and points out the difference between the “TCC” solution, open only the buyside, and the “Citadel solution,” which would open the clearinghouse for everybody, and it’s in the “interest of our nation and the entire world’s financial system.” Griffin is lobbying like a champ. Call it market efficiency: Why spend time testifying in front of Congress if you don’t also pitch your product?

1:55: Rep. Van Hollen makes an excellent point: the hedge fund industry fought regulation tooth and nail a few years ago. It gives the lie to the current professed willingness to disclose positions and accept stricter regulators.

1:58: Soros points out to Rep. Issa that regulators should understand the instruments they’re regulating, and should not allow the use of instruments they don’t understand. Sensible.

1:58: Rep. Issa throws a softball to Paulson, who he congratulates for earning a 1% return, and asks how Paulson manages leverage. This goes nowhere. We’ll spare you.

2:02: Issa asks why hedge funds should be treated differently than mutual funds when it comes to capital gains. Paulson says perhaps hedge funds should have time horizons of more than one year, and then they would be closer in profile.

2:02:
Waxman closes the session with big smooches to the hedge fund managers, the combined billionaire superwattage of which has left the Committee presumably blinded by the fund raising possibilities. Here is what Waxman says: “Congress usually has trade associations here, and they speak in their self-interest. That’s why we wanted to have you here, to get an unfiltered response.” Oh, boy. If Waxman believed the managers were not speaking in their own self-interest, it just highlights how much more Washington needs to understand how Wall Street communicates. Besides, these managers succeeded in the credit crisis, so they have nothing to be defensive about.

2:05: The session ends.

source: wsj deal journal

Hedge Funds on the Hill: Statements from John Paulson and James Simons

Friday, 14 November 2008

Hedge funds and Washington don’t mix. And yet, mix they must today, as the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform has called an all-star cast of hedge fund managers to testify on Capitol Hill. The appointed hedgies include George Soros; Paulson & Co. founder John Paulson (no relation, of course, to Hank); Citadel CEO Ken Griffin; Renaissance Technologies CEO James Simons; and Harbinger Capital Partners senior managing director Phil Falcone.

capitol0922_E_20080922144435.jpgAssociated Press

Deal Journal obtained some of the prepared statements from the hedgies and excerpted them below.

John Paulson, Paulson & Co.

Performance in a nutshell: By constructing a diverse portfolio of both long and short positions, we have been able to operate profitably in 14 out of the last 15 years, including this year and the 2000-2002 periods when the NASDAQ index lost 78% of its value. We believe that our ability to protect our investors’ capital and generate positive absolute returns with low volatility over the long term is the reason we have grown to be one of the largest hedge funds in the world.

How Paulson gets paid: We share profits with our investors on an 80/20 basis where 80% of the profits go to the investors and 20% remains with us. We only earn performance allocations if our investors are profitable. All of our funds have a “high water mark,” which means that if we lose money for our investors, we have to earn it back before we share in future profits. Some of
our funds also have a “claw back” provision, requiring us to return profits earned in prior periods
if we lose money in subsequent periods. In addition, we invest our own money alongside that of
our clients, so we share investment losses along with gains.

Don’t lump all investors together: Hedge funds, together with real estate, private equity and venture capital, are frequently categorized as “alternative investments”, in contrast to traditional stock and bond investing. Hedge funds are an important investment category for investors as returns are generally noncorrelated with the traditional market. The hedge fund market has grown rapidly over the past five years, from approximately $800 million to $2 trillion in assets under management. The US has remained a leader in this area, accounting for approximately 70% of the market, although we have lost share in recent years to London, Asia, and Switzerland – many of which offer various financial incentives to attract the hedge fund industry.

Cue the Star-Spangled Banner: As Americans, we are proud of the leadership position the United States occupies in this industry, the jobs our industry has created, the export earnings we have produced for our country and the taxes we generate for the Treasury. For example, over the last five years, our firm has increased our employee count by 10x, creating numerous high-paying jobs for Americans. In addition, eighty percent of our assets under management come from foreign investors. The revenues we receive from foreign investors allow us to contribute to the U.S. economy like an exporter of goods, bringing in money from abroad.

What next: We have also offered some public suggestions on the causes of the credit crisis and what the U.S. government can do to help the situation, specifically purchase senior preferred stock in selected financial institutions….Subsequently, the Troubled Asset Recovery Program (TARP) was reoriented to focus on the purchase of preferred stock.

(You can read Paulson’s entire statement here.)

James Simons, Renaissance Technologies

Who to blame: In my view, the crisis has many causes: The regulators who took a hands-off position on investment bank leverage and credit default swaps; everyone along the mortgage-backed securities chain who should have blown a whistle rather than passing the problem on; and, in my opinion the most culpable, the rating agencies, which allowed sows’ ears to be sold as silk purses.

Before addressing the Committee’s questions, a few words about myself and my company.

Do hedge funds cause systemic risk?: In my view, hedge funds were not a
major contributor to the recent crisis. Generally, hedge funds have increased liquidity and reduced volatility in the markets. Moreover, because of their remarkably diverse strategies, hedge funds, as a class, are unlikely to create systemic risk. Hedge funds do use leverage, but each hedge fund’s leverage is stringently controlled by its lenders – far more so than is true for investment banks.

Do hedge funds require further regulation?: I do think additional regulation focused on *market integrity and stability* would be useful.

Should hedge funds be more transparent?:
Transparency to appropriate regulators can be helpful. You may wish to consider requiring all market participants to report their positions to an appropriate regulator and then allowing the New York Fed to have access to aggregate position information and to recommend action if necessary. I stress, however, that the fund-specific information should never be released publicly, which could do far more harm than good.

How do we get out of this hole?: In the near term, the most important thing we can do is to keep people in their homes, even if their mortgages are in default.

For the longer term, I propose a new ratings entity…. I therefore encourage the major holders of these bonds, such as CalPERS, TIAA and PIMCO, to sponsor a new, non-profit rating agency, focused on derivative securities. Congress might consider chartering such an organization, having Board representation from appropriate regulators. Revenues could come from buyer-paid fees. These complex instruments then would be subject to proper analysis and rating, the interests of buyers and raters would be aligned, and the likelihood of again seeing a problem like this one would be dramatically reduced.

source: wsj deal journal

Latest Hedge Fund Chore: Preventing Investor Stampedes

Thursday, 13 November 2008

WSJ colleague Jenny Strasburg files this dispatch on turmoil in the hedge-fund industry.

Blue Mountain Capital Management, fighting a wave of investor redemptions despite its relatively solid performance, seems to have succeeded in convincing some clients to stick around for at least another year.

[go]
Associated Press

The New York hedge fund, a big credit-market player, was in a bind last week. Clients had asked to withdraw more than 25% of the assets from its $3.1 billion Credit Alternatives Fund, the firm’s biggest.

Across the hedge-fund landscape, investors needing cash are seeking money wherever they can get it, and not just from funds that have posted big losses. The Blue Mountain fund is down about 2% this year on investment declines, it told investors. Most hedge funds have posted significantly steeper drops. Some investors are simply nervous about the possibility of future losses as they eye signs that the economy is worsening.

It is especially hard at a time like this for a fund like Blue Mountain, which deals in complex securities, to satisfy a high level of redemptions. Doing so means selling a lot of bank loans, bonds and other assets at a discount, hurting all of the fund’s investors and unloading out-of-favor securities into an already-frozen market.

To tempt investors into staying, Blue Mountain Chief Executive Andrew Feldstein and his team offered lower fees. They also told investors that whoever wanted to pull out would suffer alone. That is, assets representing their share of the fund would be segregated into a special account, and whatever losses resulted from selling those assets would be borne by redeeming investors, and not those sticking with the fund.

It is clear that a lot of investors wanted their money out, regardless: Investors holding about 20% of assets still opted to redeem as soon as possible, Mr. Feldstein told investors in a letter today.

The rest agreed to lock in their money for at least another year. If Blue Mountain turns a profit, they will be rewarded with a share of the profit in addition to the new, lower fees. Blue Mountain, meanwhile, which oversees $5.5 billion total in all of its funds, hopes to pull in new money–now that it knows how much is staying–and plans to snap up credit assets on the cheap.

One caveat: It isn’t a simple task to segregate complex debt securities into separate accounts in a market complicated by declining values and volatility. If it can’t be done, Blue Mountain could tell all investors they have to stay put for the time being, it warned in its letter.

source: wsj deal journal

Los hedge funds en la situación actual del mercado - Finanzas.com

Wednesday, 12 November 2008
Los hedge funds en la situación actual del mercado
Finanzas.com - 11 Nov 2008
Los fondos event driven (arbitraje de fusiones, valores de compañías con problemas y situaciones especiales) también se vieron afectados por la ampliación

fuente: google

Hedge fund results seen going from bad to worse

Friday, 7 November 2008

NEW YORK (Reuters) - While September was brutal for hedge funds, October was even worse.

source: reuters

El mayor short squeeze de la Historia

Thursday, 6 November 2008

Dada la mala fama de los supuestamente malvados hedge funds que especulan vendiendo en descubierto las acciones atesoradas por las ancianitas para arruinarlas, mucha gente parece estar encantada por las colosales pérdidas que algunos de estos “desaprensivos” gestores…[+]

fuente: cotizalia